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GOVERNANCE 
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ABSTRACT 
  The Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers 
District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund presents new 
challenges for boards of directors. The opinion speaks to whether and 
when an issuer’s statement of belief can be false or misleading other 
than by proof that the issuer’s genuine opinion was different from what 
it stated. Statements of opinion imply something about how the belief 
was formed, and that process implicates the role of directors as 
fiduciaries. 
  This Article uses Omnicare as a starting point for exploring and 
developing the interplay between disclosure, discourse, and fiduciary 
duties. Using the lens of corporate-discourse theory, this Article 
explores how the judicial process extracts (or should extract) meaning 
from ambiguous, often strategically crafted words communicated to 
vastly complicated financial markets. Questions such as what it means 
for a corporate entity—a legal fiction incapable of thought—to express 
a belief, who the “we” is in “we believe our practices are legally 
compliant,” and what it means to believe, all help to frame the 
conversation about the role of directors in disciplining the corporate-
disclosure process. 
  Federal securities law cases that raise questions about disclosure 
related to legal compliance and derivative lawsuits challenging board 
oversight are common after a big corporate penalty for violations of 
federal or state law. Regulators are also pushing boards of directors to 
participate more in legal and disclosure quality control. To the extent 
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that Omnicare was favorable to plaintiffs in allowing some suits to 
proceed notwithstanding belief or opinion qualifiers, this Article posits 
that boards need to exercise greater responsibility for disclosures, 
particularly with respect to legal compliance. In this manner, the 
securities laws perform in an information-forcing-substance manner, 
creating a disclosure regime that is backed by due diligence and 
fiduciary performance. Finally, this Article argues that the Omnicare 
litigation—and control over discourse about legal risk—belongs in the 
broader context of board fiduciary responsibility for enterprise risk 
management generally, and legal compliance in particular. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare Inc. v. Laborers 
District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund1 is an extended 
exercise in corporate-discourse theory. Omnicare’s registration 
statement for a public offering under the Securities Act of 19332 stated 
the company’s belief that its marketing practices to certain kinds of 
pharmacies were lawful.3 Later, the government decided that they were 
not and took legal action against the company.4 
The question before the Court was whether and when that 
statement of belief could be found false or misleading other than by 
proof that the issuer’s genuine opinion at the time was different from 
what it stated.5 The Court said it might, because words in context can 
generate inferences for the reasonable investor that go beyond narrow 
linguistic confines.6 The statement of opinion could imply something 
about how the belief was formed that might be untrue, or it could imply 
that certain facts do not exist when in fact they do. Thus, the case was 
remanded for further proceedings, including to consider evidence that 
a lawyer had supposedly described one of Omnicare’s contracts as 
 
 1. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1323 (2015). 
 2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012).  
 3. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323. 
 4. Id. at 1324.  
 5. As discussed below, this issue followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia 
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991), which held that misstatements of opinion can 
be material and hence actionable under certain circumstances. Id. at 1097. Dicta in the Court’s 
decision suggested that liability would follow if, but only if, the statement was both not genuinely 
believed and objectively false. Id. at 1095–96. Many lower courts followed that instruction 
literally. See, e.g., MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P. 761 F.3d 
1109, 1114 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014). For a good discussion of the case law, see generally Wendy 
Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381 (2013). 
 6. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1328–30. 
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high-risk. The question on remand would be whether that or anything 
similar uncovered by the plaintiffs rendered the unqualified 
compliance opinion misleading even if genuinely believed. 
A lower court has two main options to deal with these kinds of 
claims. First, it can declare the matter a contested fact question 
reserved for the fact finder at trial. But securities-law trials rarely 
occur. The probability of settlement is overwhelming in the aftermath 
of any such declaration, and perceptions about meritless (or low-merit) 
settlements make many judges uneasy.7 Second, the court can dismiss 
the case for failure to state a cause of action or on a motion for 
summary judgment, which seems to happen more frequently in 
securities litigation than civil procedure doctrine would suggest. Judges 
often take on the role of assessing what reasonable investors think, 
employing heuristics—often empirically questionable ones, as both 
authors have written elsewhere8—that have a big normative bite when 
they result in dismissal. 
After examining Omnicare’s teachings in Part I, Part II explores 
the Court’s decision through this discourse lens: how the judicial 
process extracts (or should extract) meaning from ambiguous, often 
strategically crafted, words and actions communicated to vastly 
complicated financial markets. The focus will be on compliance-related 
disclosures, though it applies to other disclosure issues as well. One 
need not be an obsessive postmodernist to doubt that a single preferred 
meaning can ever confidently be extracted from text. Meanings vary 
based on, among other things, prior beliefs and expectations brought 
to the task of interpretation by a diverse audience of investors. 
Privileging one meaning as the “reasonable” one in hindsight invites 
arbitrariness at best, bias at worst. 
Lurking in all of this is a palpable epistemological question: What 
does it mean for an entity—a legal fiction, incapable of thought—to 
express a belief? Who is “we” when the company says “we believe our 
practices are legally compliant,” and what does it mean to believe?9 
 
 7. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163–64 (2008) 
(expressing concerns about settlement pressures). 
 8. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 
481 (1994) (examining the bespeaks caution doctrine in securities-fraud litigation); Hillary A. 
Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002) (exploring use of judge-made 
heuristics in securities-fraud cases). Cf. Stephen Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges 
Maximize? (The Same Way Everyone Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities 
Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 84–85 (2002) (discussing ill-informed rules of thumb). 
 9. See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325 (discussing the meaning of statements of belief). 
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This is important when the authors of the disclosure lack personal 
knowledge of whatever was amiss, but someone else in the company 
knew troubling facts. Using this prompt, Part III sheds light on what 
(and if so how much) Omnicare has to say about liability for statements 
of opinion in a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit, where corporate scienter, rather 
than strict liability, is the norm for issuers. Indeed, a companion 
Omnicare case involving the same alleged misstatements of opinion 
about compliance raises exactly this issue.10 
That is a natural bridge to this Article’s main goal of exploring 
Omnicare through the lens of corporate governance and fiduciary 
responsibility.11 Part IV addresses this issue. Arguably, Omnicare made 
a poor legal decision in its contracting practices. Federal securities law 
cases challenging disclosure about legal compliance are common in the 
aftermath of a big corporate penalty for a violation of federal or state 
law.12 Derivative lawsuits are brought under state corporate law in the 
same circumstances, complaining that the board of directors failed to 
prevent the wrongdoing through inadequate monitoring. In Delaware, 
these so-called “Caremark cases”13 have dwindled in importance 
because the Delaware courts have made them extremely difficult for 
shareholders to win on the merits, insisting on proof that the directors 
acted in bad faith.14 There are many interesting connections between 
these two lines of cases despite—or maybe because of—their different 
trajectories. There is also a growing perception from a variety of other 
authorities—the Justice Department, the SEC, and other financial 
regulatory agencies—that boards of directors must become more 
deeply involved in legal and disclosure quality control in any event.15 
 
 10. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2014); infra notes 101–104 
and accompanying text. 
 11. The symposium honoree, Jim Cox, shares this particular interest. See generally James D. 
Cox, “We’re Cool” Statements After Omnicare: Securities Fraud Suits for Failures to Comply with 
the Law, 68 S.M.U. L. REV. 715 (2015) (exploring implications of the Omnicare case). 
 12. For examples of such cases, see JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. 
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 686–93 (7th ed. 2013).  
 13. The seminal case is In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996), which set the standard for board of director liability for a compliance breakdown, 
effectively limiting such liability to instances of sustained and systematic indifference. Id. at 971; 
see also Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (en 
banc) (describing liability standard as one of bad faith).  
 14. Interestingly, however, these cases have occurred elsewhere, like California, and 
survived motions to dismiss. See, e.g., In re Intuitive Surgical S’holder Derivative Litig., 146 F. 
Supp. 3d 1106, 1121–22 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding shareholders successfully alleged demand futility 
in oversight and monitoring case). 
 15. See infra Part IV.C. 
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To the extent that Omnicare was favorable to plaintiffs in allowing 
some suits to proceed notwithstanding belief or opinion qualifiers, 
boards and executives have more to worry about in terms of corporate 
and (perhaps) personal liability risk when the company has a 
compliance failure. Part IV therefore situates the Omnicare 
litigation—and control over discourse about legal risk—in the broader 
context of board fiduciary responsibility for enterprise risk 
management generally, and legal compliance in particular. 
I.  OMNICARE’S TEACHINGS 
In Omnicare, the Supreme Court addressed one of the more 
complicated areas of securities fraud: statements of opinion and belief 
in the context of omissions or “half-truths.” An omission is not a 
statement. It is the absence of a statement or fact, and that absence is 
one of the key aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Omnicare. 
Determining when a statement of opinion or belief requires more 
information or factual clarification so that it is not misleading is 
important because that omission will then support a claim for securities 
fraud. For this Article’s purposes, however, the “absence” of the 
information is also important because it can define the content of the 
corporate fiduciaries’ duties. That is the issue on which this Article 
focuses: the interplay between securities and corporate law in the 
context of the board of directors and its role in the oversight and risk-
management decisions that form the bounds for business choices and 
compliance. Or, put differently, how the decisions of board fiduciaries 
with respect to the exercise of their duties might be influenced by the 
need to disclose information about those decisions and choices. 
In Omnicare, the plaintiffs alleged that the company’s offering 
documents contained misstatements about contract arrangements with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and suppliers, including that the 
arrangements were in compliance with the law or legally valid.16 At 
some point, however, it became clear that the federal government 
believed that the arrangements involved illegal kickbacks.17 The 
allegations included both affirmative misstatements and half-truths, 
which are misstatements that omit information necessary to make the 
statements not misleading.18 
 
 16. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1324 (2015). 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
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The key statutory provision at issue here is Section 11 of the 1933 
Act, which states: 
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became 
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring 
such security . . . may . . . sue.19 
This provision provides for two different types of misstatements. 
The first clause focuses on what the issuer stated affirmatively and the 
second on what the issuer did not say or omitted.20 Neither requires 
fraud or the intent to deceive,21 and as a result, neither involves the 
scienter-based pleading standard that applies to Rule 10b-5 claims. 
Indeed, Section 11 is a strict-liability provision. 
The purpose of Section 11 is well understood as providing an 
enforcement mechanism for the Securities Act’s provisions requiring 
“full and fair disclosure of information” when engaging in a public 
offering.22 The premise is that issuer offerings of securities—
particularly initial public offerings—present significant information 
asymmetries. The officers and directors of the issuer know far more 
than outside purchasers. In that sense, offerings resemble insider 
trading, and the purpose of the disclosures is to correct for the 
asymmetry.23 The regulatory apparatus requires an extensive array of 
specific disclosures, as well as containing a requirement of additional 
information necessary to prevent misleading disclosures.24 Thus, 
embedded in the disclosure requirements is a prohibition against 
misleading half-truths.25 
 
 19. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).  
 20. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 646 (1988)). 
 23. Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 482 (2000).  
 24. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2015) (“In addition to the information expressly required to 
be included in a registration statement, there shall be added such further material information, if 
any, as may be necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading.”).  
 25. The scope of this prohibition is at issue here and has been the focus of considerable 
scholarly writing including by one of the authors here. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half-
Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999) 
(placing the half-truth doctrine in the context of the broader debate over the affirmative duty to 
disclose information to parties on the other side of a transaction).  
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In Omnicare, the Supreme Court’s analysis focused on two alleged 
misstatements, both of which contained the words, “we believe,” at the 
beginning. There is a special category of disclosures referred to as 
statements of opinion and belief. The first statement pointed to by the 
plaintiffs was: 
We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare 
providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy practices 
are in compliance with applicable federal and state laws.26 
The second was: 
We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
legally and economically valid arrangements that bring value to the 
healthcare system and the patients that we serve.27 
Both of these statements are grounded in legal analysis. Both were also 
surrounded by other statements that provided context, including that 
there were actual and potential state and federal enforcement actions 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers for illegal payments to 
pharmacies.28 After the offering, the federal government in fact 
brought charges against Omnicare, and the plaintiffs sued, arguing that 
the above-quoted statements were misleading. 
The district court dismissed the case, and the Sixth Circuit 
reversed. The main issues were whether a statement of belief, here 
denoted by the language “we believe,” is actionable and whether there 
are “hard facts” included in (or omitted from) these statements.29 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court divided its analysis into two parts. The first 
was whether the alleged misstatements contained statements of 
material fact. This question, the Court noted, required it to resolve 
when an opinion or belief can be a factual misstatement.30 The second 
part of the Court’s analysis focused on whether Omnicare failed to 
include material facts necessary to make a statement not misleading. 
This question required a different approach centered on when an 
opinion or belief statement can be misleading by virtue of “the 
omission of discrete factual representations.”31 
 
 26. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Joint Appendix at 95, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 
13-435)). 
 27. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 137, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-435)). 
 28. See Omnicare, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 14–15 (Mar. 16, 2005). 
 29. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1324. 
 30. Id. at 1325. 
 31. Id.  
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This bifurcated approach seems almost self-evident given the 
statutory text, yet it arose from substantial doctrinal uncertainty in the 
lower courts over the last few decades. Many lower courts had adopted 
the view that statements of opinion or belief can be fraudulent only if 
they were not actually believed and were objectively false.32 The effect 
was a safe harbor, or a space in which liability did not exist, for most 
such statements absent the plaintiff’s willingness and ability to 
challenge the honesty of the belief.33 
The Supreme Court said that such an approach makes sense when 
plaintiffs are attacking the statement as a misrepresentation. The Court 
started by differentiating factual statements from opinion statements, 
noting that a true opinion does not convey definiteness. Indeed, the 
Court held that an opinion communicates the opposite: that the 
speaker does not know the matter in question with certainty.34 This 
distinction was important because liability under Section 11’s first 
clause penalizes only misstatements of fact. The difference is one of 
determinable or verifiable statements that, under Section 11, are 
subject to liability even if unintentional or uninformed. In contrast, 
opinion statements are actionable in two circumstances—when they 
are not honestly held or believed and when they contain inaccurate 
“embedded statements of fact.”35 As construed by the Court, the latter 
 
 32. See MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P., 761 F.3d 1109, 
1113 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a plaintiff must show that a defendant both expressed an 
opinion he did not believe (“subjective disbelief”) and that the opinion was actually false 
(“objective falsity”)); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.—Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 
(3d Cir. 1993) (stating that opinions “may be actionable misrepresentations if the speaker does 
not genuinely and reasonably believe them”). 
 33. In securities litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are reluctant to challenge good-faith beliefs. 
One reason often given is that subjective disbelief—or a bad-faith belief—is hard to prove because 
delving into the minds of corporate actors is too challenging. Perhaps so, but this seems 
overstated. Judges and juries can infer dishonesty from facts and circumstances, and do so all the 
time. Perhaps the bigger reason has to do with insurance. Because most officer and director 
policies contain fraud exclusions, plaintiffs’ lawyers will often want to play down that which 
smacks of deliberate deceit in favor of characterizations (ranging from strict liability to 
recklessness) that justify resort to the insurance notwithstanding the policy language. See TOM 
BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 186–87 (2010). In addition, 
there is case law under Section 11 imposing a higher pleading burden with respect to claims that 
“sound in fraud.” See, e.g., Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that a Section 11 claim sounding in fraud must state with particularity circumstances 
constituting fraud). 
 34. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1325. 
 35. Id. at 1327. 
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situation would occur when the speaker offers an opinion statement 
with supporting facts that are not true.36 
The Court then applied these two categories of liability to the 
statements cited by the plaintiffs and held that neither was subject to 
liability under Section 11’s first clause, misstatement of a material fact. 
First, because the alleged misstatements were pure opinions, the Court 
held that the supporting-facts situation did not apply.37 Second, the 
Court held that the plaintiffs had not alleged that Omnicare’s belief 
was not honestly held (in fact, the complaint disclaimed any allegation 
sounding in fraud),38 and, thus, the claim was not actionable. Instead, 
the Court reasoned that the first allegation amounted to one about a 
belief that turned out to be wrong, which is not actionable under the 
first part of Section 11.39 
For this Article’s purposes, however, it is the second part of the 
Court’s opinion that is the most interesting,40 particularly as it pertains 
to corporate fiduciary duties. Here is where the Court explored the 
context of omissions and half-truths and holds that liability can exist 
when the omission of a fact makes an opinion statement misleading to 
the reasonable investor.41 The Court first rejected the defendant’s 
argument that “a pure statement of opinion [cannot] convey anything 
more than the speaker’s own mindset.”42 This interpretation of the 
second clause of Section 11, the Court noted, would essentially 
eliminate liability absent proof of the opposite mindset and collapse 
liability under the second clause to that under the first. This crucial 
move essentially rejects the position of many lower courts that had 
found otherwise. 
Instead, the Court held that the objective reasonable investor can 
“understand an opinion statement to convey facts about how the 
speaker has formed the opinion—or, otherwise put, about the 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. But that allegation alone will not give rise to liability under Section 11’s first clause 
because, as this Article has shown, a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an “untrue statement 
of material fact” regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1324 (indicating that Plaintiffs did “explicitly exclude and disclaim any allegation 
that could be construed as alleging fraud or intentional or reckless misconduct.” (quoting Joint 
Appendix at 273, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-345))).  
 39. Id. (“That clause, limited as it is to factual statements, does not allow investors to second-
guess inherently subjective and uncertain assessments.”). 
 40. For a thorough discussion of Omnicare’s first prong and its implications, see Wendy 
Gerwick Couture, False Statements of Belief as Securities Fraud, 2015 SEC. REG. L.J. 351, 352–53. 
 41. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1327–28. 
 42. Id. at 1328. 
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speaker’s basis for holding that view.”43 The Court then applied this 
definition to legal-compliance situations, noting that the statement, 
“[w]e believe our conduct is lawful,” could be incomplete and 
misleading if the issuer had not consulted a lawyer or if the issuer did 
not believe the statement.44 Thus, the Court held that a reasonable 
investor interpreting such a statement would expect both that the 
issuer actually believed it and that it “fairly align[ed] with the 
information in the issuer’s possession at the time.”45 
The Court clarified, however, that an issuer might be in possession 
of conflicting facts that it does not have to disclose. This situation does 
not necessarily make the opinion statement actionable as an omission. 
To clarify this type of fact pattern, the Court offered the example of a 
single junior attorney doubting the legality of a compliance choice with 
six or more senior colleagues approving of it.46 Here, the Court noted, 
the omission would not be actionable even if the junior lawyer turned 
out to be correct.47 The rationale for this distinction was that 
reasonable investors do not expect to know every fact the issuer knew 
when making the statement. And issuers are not required to share all 
of their knowledge or internal information. Indeed, context is 
everything, and customs and practices matter. Nevertheless, the Court 
noted that opinion statements should not be “baseless, off-the-cuff 
judgments.”48 
Importantly for this Article’s purposes, the Court also held that 
some opinions can be reasonably understood to mean that the issuer 
had information to justify the opinion and that, in some circumstances, 
an issuer might have to add information to an opinion to ensure that 
the opinion is not misleading by omission.49 This requirement is by no 
means new,50 but in the context of situations like legal compliance, it 
presses on the already porous boundary between securities disclosure 
and state-law corporate fiduciary duties. As a result, it is another 
 
 43. Id. Here, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that a lawyer had opined that a “particular 
contract ‘carrie[d] a heightened risk’ of liability under anti-kickback laws.” Id. at 1324 (quoting 
Joint Appendix at 225, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-435)). 
 44. Id. at 1328. 
 45. Id. at 1329. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 1330. The court referred to tort law more generally in support for these arguments. 
Id. 
 49. Id. at 1330–31. 
 50. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.408 (2015). 
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example of how the federal securities laws act in an information-
forcing manner. Simply put, fiduciaries—who make securities 
disclosures and face potential liability—must consider whether the 
disclosure is sufficiently fulsome and, in doing so, may well expand the 
role that they play in ensuring the compliance or oversight situation is 
properly handled. Indeed, when opinions are based on expertise, 
simple statements of belief may not suffice. Instead, in addition to 
offering the opinion, issuers may need to articulate some facts 
undergirding that opinion or “make clear the real tentativeness of [the] 
belief.”51 In this manner, the required federal securities disclosure 
forces action or conduct on the part of fiduciaries and becomes an 
information-forcing-substance regulation that occupies space in the 
state-law, fiduciary-duty zone. 
The Court’s required pleading for such a claim is strict: plaintiffs 
must identify particular, material facts about “the inquiry the issuer did 
or did not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not have” such that 
their absence renders the opinion misleading by omission.52 As 
explored below, the nature of this type of omission may have particular 
salience for the risk-management and compliance roles of corporate 
fiduciaries, or their so-called good-faith and Caremark duties. 
II.  HALF-TRUTHS AND LEGAL RISK 
Part I demonstrated how Omnicare adds powerfully to the ways 
plaintiffs in securities-fraud actions can seek to have an opinion 
statement relating to legal compliance declared false or misleading. 
Part II.A turns to how courts will address these new challenges and 
how they should go about drawing inferences from compliance-related 
disclosures. Part II.B then addresses how Omnicare applies to 
statements that may not explicitly be labelled as opinions but involve 
the similar exercise of judgment or estimation. 
A. Omnicare and the Process of Inference 
The securities law relating to the disclosure of legal risk is, to 
nonlawyers at least, unintuitive and deeply muddled. When an issuer is 
held responsible for a violation of law, the sanctions—monetary, 
preventative, and reputational—can be powerful. Legal wrongdoing 
 
 51. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332. The Court also rejected the argument that liability for 
misleading opinions would “chill disclosures useful to investors.” Id. Instead, the Court’s view was 
that issuers have an incentive to sell and therefore to disclose. Id.  
 52. Id. 
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and legal risk can be highly material to investors, related directly to 
their (and the market’s) valuation of the company. A company whose 
business model depends on a continuing pattern of illegality is 
probably not a good investment. 
Materiality notwithstanding, there is no automatic duty to disclose 
wrongdoing or legal risk.53 The absence of duty is partly because of a 
gradual judicial narrowing of “duty to disclose” doctrine under the 
major liability provisions of the securities laws, particularly Section 11 
and Rule 10b-5. More so, it is because the SEC has never specified 
disclosure obligations regarding unlawful behavior, leaving a murky 
line that lawyers have to navigate that leaves temptation for 
concealment. For some time now, courts have indicated that they are 
reluctant to imply affirmative duties of disclosure when the SEC has 
failed to explicitly articulate one.54 There are line-item disclosure 
duties with respect to “risk factors,” pending or threatened litigation, 
and known trends and uncertainties reasonably likely to occur that 
might impact the company’s valuation metrics.55 Each of these may 
indirectly force some disclosure of legal risk, but not necessarily. Even 
if the risk has to be disclosed, moreover, there is no duty to “handicap” 
the likelihood of liability.56 There are many reasons for the SEC’s 
reticence to regulate these disclosures explicitly, some stemming from 
the same general legal principles that permit legal advice to be kept 
confidential. The law normally allows people and firms to advocate 
their legal interests in good faith without forcing them to self-handicap 
 
 53. E.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1987). This lack of duty 
coheres with the more general point that a duty to disclose does not exist simply because the 
speaker knows of material nonpublic information. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224 (1988). For a discussion of resulting efforts to create a duty, see generally Donald C. 
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 1639 (2004). For a good illustration of the inconsistency between whether there is a duty or 
not, compare Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing a 
duty based on SEC line-item requirements), with In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 
1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (no such duty). 
 54. E.g., Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 269 F.3d 806, 808–10 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 55. For a recent judicial discussion of each of these in assessing the duty to disclose an SEC 
investigation into disclosure wrongdoing, see In re Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. Sec. Litig., 
No. 14-CV-5197, 2016 WL 297722, at *6–11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2016). 
 56. E.g., In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225, 2012 WL 4471265, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 28, 2012), aff’d sub nom. City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 
F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Indeed, absent an express prior disclosure, a corporation has no 
affirmative duty to speculate or disclose ‘uncharged, unadjudicated wrongdoings or 
mismanagement,’ illegal internal policies, or violations of a company’s internal codes of conduct 
and legal policies.” (quoting Ciresi v. Citicorp., 782 F. Supp. 819, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 956 
F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1992))).  
SALE & LANGEVOORT IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2016  11:01 AM 
2016] “WE BELIEVE” 775 
by laying all their low cards on the table. Moreover, legal analysis is 
often complicated and contingent, not well-suited to concise 
summarization. 
The absence of any clear duty means that plaintiffs have to look 
at what was said rather than simply what was concealed. Before 
Omnicare, many courts assumed that opinions were fraudulent only if 
not genuinely believed, based on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision 
in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.57 Omnicare’s disclosure 
lawyers therefore probably thought that inserting the words “we 
believe” would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, their client’s 
securities-law liability risk. Omnicare’s holding that opinions may 
imply more than they say thus increases the scope of liability that 
issuers face. The Court’s opinion now invites plaintiffs to stress the 
implications of what was said to escape having to prove that defendants 
actually knew of the falsity. 
The Court’s decision, however, does not say much about the size 
of this escape route. In the law of half-truths, an overly broad approach 
to implication turns the doctrine into a back-door duty to disclose 
based solely on materiality.58 To limit the scope, the common 
touchstone—given context and the background norms of disclosure or 
confidentiality with respect to the kind of information at stake59—is 
whether the omitted information “fairly aligns” or not with what the 
issuer chose to say.60 If the dissonance between the statement and the 
truth is too great, the result is an actionable omission.61 How much 
dissonance is too much is hard to predict in advance, but it is the kind 
of question disclosure lawyers frequently confront. 
 
 57. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991); see supra note 5; see also MHC 
Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P., 761 F.3d 1109, 1114 n.2 (10th Cir. 
2014) (criticizing the Sixth Circuit’s Omnicare opinion). Some other courts had anticipated 
Omnicare by allowing the subjective falsity element to be avoided when the statement of opinion 
implied the absence of additional facts tending seriously to undermine the accuracy of the 
statement. E.g., Reese v. Malone, 747 F.3d 557, 572 (9th Cir. 2014); In re Apple Comput. Sec. 
Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989).  
 58. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 90. 
 59. For a discussion of background norms and reasonable implications, see id. at 92. See also 
Robert J. Bloomfield, A Pragmatic Approach to More Efficient Corporate Disclosure, 26 ACCT. 
HORIZONS 357, 358–61 (2012) (offering an implications-based approach). 
 60. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1329 (2015). 
 61. E.g., In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL NO. 4:10-MD-2185, 2016 WL 3090779, at *15 (S.D. 
Tex. May 31, 2016) (applying half-truth teachings of Omnicare to statements pertaining to oil 
spill). 
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The underlying problem—which courts have never fully 
addressed—is that there are conflicting visions of the reasonable 
investor. To some judges, reasonable investors are steely-eyed 
skeptics, who are unlikely to draw many inferences at all beyond what 
was clearly said.62 Other judges view the reasonable investor as more 
trusting in management’s candor and hence willing to draw inferences 
that make reliance more natural and normal.63 
Imagine the following scenario: a company’s lawyers have 
identified a legal risk, which they are working to reduce without 
drawing the attention of regulatory authorities to the prior practice, 
which might trigger an unwanted lawsuit. They fail to tell the CEO any 
of these details, creating the impression that things are under control. 
They also craft the “we believe” language for the next 10-K, which is 
then incorporated by reference into the registration statement for a 
forthcoming public offering. 
The first issue is who is “we”? Under the ’33 Act, “we” 
presumably should be construed fairly broadly, not simply as 
expressing the CEO’s—as well as other executives’ and board 
members’—personal opinions. “We” fairly connotes something of a 
corporate, collective belief, and when the law is involved, a reasonable 
investor would naturally assume that this view emanates from the legal 
experts and that executive knowledge is simply derivative. The purpose 
of strict and due diligence-based liability is to force a search for 
material facts that may be scattered throughout the organization.64 
Indeed, a CEO who fails to ask whether there are or have been changes 
in the issuer’s legal status or risks is likely failing to fulfill her fiduciary 
duties. 
The harder question involves the magnitude of the legal risk the 
lawyers have identified, not whether they have shared their fears with 
the CEO or the board. Statements of opinion do not, as the Court said, 
promise or guarantee legality, even if those responsible for the legal 
analysis (that is, the company’s lawyers) are not sure of the legality. In 
complex regulatory settings, legal answers are often uncertain. The 
Court addresses this issue with the hypothetical about a junior attorney 
 
 62. E.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 514–15 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(treating investors as sophisticated readers of corporate disclosure). 
 63. E.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245–46 (1988) (granting presumption of 
reliance on the “integrity” of the market price). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662–63, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
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who expresses doubts about a particular compliance situation, noting 
that a less senior attorney’s doubts do not necessarily render an opinion 
statement as to compliance misleading.65 Situations can readily arise 
where the internal legal evaluation is that there may be some risk, but 
that the company is probably acting lawfully. The question becomes, 
would a reasonable investor be misled by an omission of the doubts? 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers will surely make that argument, which the Court 
encouraged by remanding the case for further consideration in light of 
allegations that a lawyer had raised questions about the heightened 
legal risk associated with one of Omnicare’s contracts. To be sure, that 
evidence would be damning if it undermined the argument that 
Omnicare genuinely believed it was in compliance, but that is not the 
question here. Rather, would a reasonable investor take the “we 
believe” statement as effectively saying that there are no serious 
doubts about that assessment, even if the issuer’s confidence is real? 
The result of the Court’s holding and the remand is a new sort of 
balancing test, which increases the pressure on corporate fiduciaries to 
try to assure a sound basis for statements of belief. 
There is no self-evident answer to the question just posed, 
although the Court provides some guidance by suggesting that  
an investor would likely be misled by a “we believe”—or other 
opinion—statement if the issuer knew federal authorities were taking 
the opposite position.66 One can certainly imagine a situation where a 
lawyer tells a client that the lawyer believes the client will win without 
revealing a private assessment that the chance of the client losing is 33 
percent. Most would agree that an omission of that risk renders the 
advice misleading and unfair to the client. So, the argument would go, 
the same is true for investors once the issuer has put the matter “in 
play” by expressing its belief about compliance. 
But the space for liability is not that straightforward. A lawyer has 
a fiduciary duty of full disclosure to her client; a company does not have 
the same duty to its investors, even when making a public offering. 
Sophisticated investors understand (or intuit) that companies are not 
affirmatively obliged to reveal their legal weaknesses. So perhaps they 
should not assume that a statement of belief means anything more than 
that the lawyers genuinely think the company is acting lawfully, based 
both on private information that they are not inclined to share and that 
the fiduciaries have determined that relying on that belief is 
 
 65. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329. 
 66. Id. at 1328–29.  
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reasonable. Other likely scenarios pose comparable problems of 
inference. Suppose, for example, that plaintiffs claim that the company 
lawyers were negligent in their legal analysis, either in how they 
gathered their facts or how they construed the law. Does “we believe” 
imply—as a handful of lower courts had suggested67—that there are 
reasonable grounds for the belief, so that the omission of what they 
missed was misleading even if unintentional? Remember that in the 
Section 11 context, as the Court pointed out, there is strict liability for 
the issuer, and considerable due diligence is expected in public 
offerings.68 That should affect how a reasonable investor interprets 
opinion-based language in a registration statement, providing a basis 
in the right circumstances for an implied representation of due care. 
Based on the experience with the half-truth doctrine generally, 
and the fact-based nature of all such questions, courts likely will not 
provide consistent answers to these disclosure issues. As noted earlier, 
the Supreme Court appears to have endorsed what before its decision 
was probably a minority view: that opinions can be actionable, even if 
genuinely believed, if they omit “facts tending to seriously undermine 
the accuracy of the statement.”69 To some judges, as noted earlier, the 
inference a reasonable investor would draw is a quintessential fact 
question, appropriate for resolution only at trial. Applying Omnicare 
under this approach is enforcement oriented, plaintiff friendly, and 
settlement inducing, even if the judge makes the decision but does so 
pursuant to a broad “could a reasonable investor have thought” 
standard. There is, however, a distinctive trend to turn disclosure 
interpretation into a question of law so that the judge can determine its 
reasonable meaning when the surrounding facts are assumed or 
uncontested. It is troubling when courts make overly strict and 
questionable assumptions about what reasonable investors think and 
do, dismissing cases much too readily.70 But there is the concern that 
jury determinations may, in hindsight, default to a de facto affirmative 
duty to disclose, and thus the inclination toward more rigorous judicial 
gatekeeping via an enhanced judicial interpretive power. Omnicare 
stresses how competent “courts” are to make these kinds of 
 
 67. See, e.g., In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 177 (D.D.C. 
2007) (finding liability if, among other things, there was no reasonable basis for the statement of 
opinion).  
 68. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1330. 
 69. E.g., In re Apple Comput. Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989); see supra note 
57 and accompanying text.  
 70. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
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determinations,71 which arguably can be read to make this a judge 
question. 
Judges might well follow the lead of Judge Richard Posner in a 
decision on the related issue of inference, puffery.72 He suggested that 
when soft words are used by corporate officials, reasonable investors 
sense that they may not be being given the whole story and are more 
cautious in their inferences. But even puffery fails to protect the 
executives and their company from liability if the truth simply clashes 
with the words written or spoken when addressing the situation. So, 
too, with legal opinions after Omnicare: using “we believe” or other 
opinion-based language narrows the inferences a reasonable investor 
should draw about compliance, but not to a point where the 
undisclosed facts known or available to the company and its lawyers 
indicate real doubts. When the latter is so, “we believe” creates a 
misleading impression by omission of those facts, making it 
appropriate to let the claim of fraud go to trial. 
B. Applying Omnicare Beyond Opinions: Fait’s Fate 
Omnicare opens up lines of attack against statements of opinion 
that many lower courts had previously closed off by insisting on proof 
of subjective awareness of falsity. Some courts had extended this 
already powerful doctrine to expressions of “judgment” even when not 
explicitly prefaced by words like “we believe.” Most notable was the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Fait v. Regions Financial Corp.,73 which 
held in the context of Section 11 that accountants’ goodwill and loan-
loss-reserve judgments were not actionable absent knowing falsity 
because, in essence, those judgments were opinions. There was no 
better example of turning the text of Section 11 on its head, potentially 
constricting accountants’ liability risk in ways that powerfully 
undermine the diligence-forcing role commonly ascribed to that 
provision. Indeed, it is fair to say that there is no gatekeeping in that 
standard. 
 
 71. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332. 
 72. Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745–46 (7th Cir. 1997). As others have pointed 
out, Omnicare should be read to call into question the scope of the puffery defense, insofar as 
puffery can trigger the same omission-based inferences as opinions. See Couture, supra note 40, 
at 359–61; Cox, supra note 11, at 718–20.  
 73. Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011). Wendy Gerwick Couture has 
discussed the case law on what constitutes an opinion both before and after Omnicare. See 
Couture, supra note 40, at 355–57.  
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Omnicare did not directly address what constitutes an opinion, 
though the Court’s discussion stressed the importance of words like 
“we believe” in signaling to readers some degree of uncertainty.74 
There is, however, nothing in Omnicare to suggest unnatural breadth 
to the meaning of opinion or belief: discretion surely can be exercised 
recklessly, not just dishonestly. More clearly, Omnicare rejects the idea 
that the absence of dishonesty is a complete defense to opinion-based 
fraud.75 Fait assumed otherwise.76 At the very least, plaintiffs can now 
argue that the accountants’ attestation or agreement as to the 
application of generally accepted accounting principles implied the 
absence of any facts that would seriously undermine the 
reasonableness of their exercise of discretion, whether or not those 
facts were actually known by the accountants.77 As a background norm, 
investors reasonably assume that what is or is not said comes out of a 
process that conforms to professional standards for both accounting 
and auditing, something on which either plaintiffs or defendants might 
seize depending on whether there was a departure from those 
standards and the reasons for the departure.78 
III.  LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND CORPORATE SCIENTER 
That Omnicare raised capital via a registered public offering in 
which the lawfulness of its marketing practices were at issue was 
something of a happenstance, making the availability of the Section 11 
remedy to some plaintiffs fortuitous. In the absence of a 
contemporaneous public offering, these kinds of compliance-failure 
cases are brought as “fraud on the market” class actions under the less 
plaintiff-friendly Rule 10b-5. Even when Section 11 is available, the 
class of purchasers who can take advantage of it is limited to those who 
acquired newly issued securities, not all of those who bought stock in 
the open market at some time during the time of the fraud.79  
 
 74. See Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1328–29. 
 75. Id. at 1329 & n.7.  
 76. The Second Circuit has acknowledged this recently, though it applied Omnicare to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim anyway. Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209–10 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 77. See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin. Inc. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 3d 759, 776 (E.D. Va. 2015) 
(addressing such an argument). 
 78. For a discussion of Fait and Omnicare suggesting that liability will be rare unless a 
plaintiff shows an inconsistency between the accounting judgment and GAAP, see Linda L. 
Griggs, John J. Huber & Christian J. Mixter, Omnicare and GAAP-Based ‘Numerical Opinions,’ 
47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1293, 1294 (June 29, 2015). 
 79. See Sale, supra note 23, at 432. 
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Hence—as was the case in the litigation against Omnicare—a parallel 
10b-5 suit accompanies the Securities Act complaint. The statements 
as to belief in the legality of Omnicare’s marketing practices were made 
in the company’s 10-Ks and 10-Qs, which were incorporated by 
reference into the ’33 Act registration statement.80 
As explored above, the Court’s decision in Omnicare is heavily 
grounded in Section 11’s text, so a fair question is whether the decision 
affects 10b-5 cases. There are two main points of distinction. First, 
Section 11 creates strict liability, so that what senior management knew 
or did not know about the legal risk is not dispositive if what is said was 
misleading. By contrast, 10b-5 has a demanding scienter requirement. 
Second, public offerings have a unique discipline—required disclosure 
backed up by extensive due diligence—that affects how reasonable 
investors read the disclosures. 
Those differences are important, to be sure, but as most courts 
post-Omnicare81 have held, the decision says much that also governs 
10b-5 litigation. Most of the Court’s opinion focuses on the words in 
Section 11 that impose liability when the disclosure contained “an 
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact 
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading.”82 Rule 10b-5(b) is nearly identical in linguistic 
structure: it is unlawful “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.”83 The Court’s extended discussion of how 
reasonable investors construe statements of opinion involves 
 
 80. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B5), at S-58 (June 11, 2003) 
(“We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare providers, our pharmaceutical 
suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in compliance with applicable federal and state laws”); 
Omnicare, Inc., Prospectus Supp. (Form 424B5), at S-52 (June 4, 2003) (same); Omnicare, Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 13 (Mar. 28, 2002) (same); Omnicare, Inc., Registration 
Statement (Form S-3), S-16 (Feb. 26, 1996) (same). 
 81. E.g., In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL NO. 4:10-MD-2185, 2016 WL 3090779, at *15 (S.D. 
Tex. May 31, 2016) (applying Omnicare under Rule 10b-5 to statements pertaining to oil spill); In 
re Merck & Co., Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., MDL No. 1658, 2015 WL 2250472, at *21, 
*23–24 (D.N.J. 2015) (applying Omnicare under Rule 10b-5 to statements about the safety of 
Vioxx). 
 82. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).  
 83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2015). 
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essentially the same textual exegesis regardless of which provision is 
invoked.84  
Yet, as the Court stresses, context matters.85 The in terrorem 
nature of Section 11 in the public-offering context may be unique, 
justifying greater reliance on what was said, but in the last few decades, 
Congress and the SEC have worked to make ’34 Act reporting much 
more disciplined and reliable too. That is the point of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act86—created after the Enron and WorldCom scandals—which 
imposed an executive-certification requirement, stepped up internal 
controls responsibilities, and enhanced its audit committee obligations 
among many other reforms.87 Regardless of the message, this 
requirement is about the solemnity and diligence that goes into the 
drafting of registration statements, which applies just as well to other 
SEC filings. Indeed, the idea behind shelf registration and integrated 
disclosure for seasoned issuers (like Omnicare) is comparable to 
reliability. Reasonable investors are unlikely to read registration 
statements and 10-Ks very differently. 
Moving beyond SEC filings under the ’34 Act as the source of a 
misrepresentation or half-truth, however, clearly changes the context. 
Statements may be made to investors in conference calls and meetings, 
for example, and there is increasing use of social media for company 
disclosure. When the disclosure environment is less formal, reasonable 
implications may shift. Perhaps there is less expectation of careful 
drafting or due diligence behind a brief tweet expressing good news.88 
But even if this is so, Omnicare’s reader-centric approach has much to 
say in 10b-5 cases. 
Scienter is a harder challenge because it removes the anomaly that 
so troubled the Court in reconciling the defendants’ claim that opinions 
are necessarily intent-based with the Securities Act’s regime of strict 
liability for issuers, and a due-diligence defense for others. Defense 
 
 84. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 
1318, 1328–1330 (2015). The same is also true of SEC enforcement actions under Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act, or Rule 14a-9 for misrepresentations in proxy materials. 
 85. Id. at 1330.  
 86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 87. For a review of both the law and economics, see generally John C. Coates, IV & Suraj 
Srinivasan, SOX After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCT. HORIZONS 627 (2014). 
 88. See Gregory S. Miller & Douglas J. Skinner, The Evolving Disclosure Landscape: How 
Changes in Technology, the Media, and Capital Markets Are Affecting Disclosure, 53 J. ACCT. 
RES. 221, 227–28 (2015) (discussing new forms of information dissemination). 
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lawyers will no doubt try to cabin Omnicare and revert to the pre-
Omnicare argument that a genuine (if misplaced) belief is a complete 
defense to 10b-5 liability, even as to half-truth claims. 
This is both dangerous and wrong.89 It is dangerous because it 
opens up too much room for dissembling: internal legal opinions are 
predictably subject to self-serving biases and overly intricate 
rationalizations. The line between advocacy and analysis often gets 
blurred, leading to overconfidence in the preferred assessment.90 As 
social scientists point out, “artful paltering”—that is, telling half-
truths—seems easier for most people to justify to themselves than 
abject lies.91 Consciously or not, lawyers often keep their clients in the 
dark, withholding detail and nuance. Senior executives may not always 
get much more than that the lawyers are “comfortable” with the 
company’s practices.92 And this practice is wrong because the effect of 
reckless omissions on investors can be just as harmful as deliberate 
ones. “We believe our marketing practices are compliant with law” 
means the same thing to investors (whatever that may be) even when 
their only private-litigation recourse is Rule 10b-5. A standard that fails 
to push executives and directors to develop an understanding of the 
basis for legal opinions, then, creates space for dissembling and due-
diligence failures. 
In sum, the better reading of Omnicare is that the scienter 
requirement for statements of opinion attacked as half-truths is the 
conventional formulation: knowledge or recklessness.93 But that 
approach still leaves open some crucial questions about whose 
knowledge or recklessness counts when talking about corporate 
 
 89. For a case where defendants’ argument was raised and rejected, see In re BP p.l.c. Sec. 
Litig., 2016 WL 3090779, MDL No. 4:10-MD-2185 at *10 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2016). 
 90. E.g., Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 133, 150 (2010). 
 91. See generally Todd Rogers, Richard Zeckhauser, Francesca Gino, Maurice Schweitzer & 
Mike Norton, Artful Paltering: The Risks and Rewards of Using Truthful Statements to  
Mislead Others (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper Series, RWP14-045, 
Sept. 2014), https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1105 [https://perma.
cc/6BSJ-QLVH] (documenting this form of deception). 
 92. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, 
Enterprise Risk and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WISC. L. REV. 495, 507–14 (describing cognitive 
pressures on in-house lawyers to view circumstances favorably to their client’s self-interest). 
 93. This level of scienter would not be so if the statement of opinion qualifies as a protected 
“forward-looking statement” under the safe harbor created by Congress for such statements. As 
Jim Cox points out, that safe harbor is not necessarily deep and may be lost if a court finds that 
the cautionary language itself is misleading as in Omnicare. See Cox, supra note 11, at 725. 
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opinions. Although this was not at issue in the case before the Supreme 
Court, it was in a separate proceeding brought under Rule 10b-5 
against Omnicare for its opinion-based compliance disclosures. In late 
2014, the Sixth Circuit rendered a decision on the 10b-5 claims that 
shows how crucial attribution of knowledge is to determining when 
opinions become half-truths.94 
Plaintiffs in the 10b-5 action stressed that at the time Omnicare 
said what it did about compliance, its Vice President for Internal Audit 
had flagged certain compliance deficiencies.95 As the Sixth Circuit saw 
it, the key question was one of corporate scienter—was the VP’s 
awareness attributed to Omnicare so that the opinion was false or 
misleading?96 Notwithstanding the importance of corporate scienter, 
the doctrine remains ambiguous, both as to pleading and proof. So the 
court sought to knit together different strands of analysis into a 
common standard.97  
The ambiguity relates to collective intent. The respondeat 
superior approach to entity knowledge is that the entity is deemed to 
know everything its agents know, but that strict approach is not used 
for imputing scienter under Rule 10b-5. The judicial instinct seems to 
be that scienter connotes awareness (or recklessness) on the part of 
those who make the disclosures being challenged. A common 
formulation says that courts should “look to the state of mind of the 
individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the 
statement (or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who 
furnish information or language for inclusion therein or the like).”98 
Although this test begins fairly narrowly, the reference to all those who 
“furnish information” is elastic, and it could be read to include all those 
with responsibility pursuant to the issuer’s disclosure controls for 
“reporting up.” That could include almost anyone with significant 
 
 94. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 95. Id. at 462. 
 96. Id. at 473. 
 97. The court drew heavily from Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of 
Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81, 133, but it did not adopt their test in its entirety. 
Like all scienter questions, the question more often arises at the time of pleading—does the 
plaintiff offer enough to create a strong inference of scienter as opposed to on the merits at trial. 
Some courts have suggested a somewhat lighter burden (and more room for “collective” 
pleading) at the pre-discovery stage of the litigation when only the pleadings are being reviewed. 
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 98. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004); see also 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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responsibilities in the organization, bringing the test close to a 
respondeat superior standard.99 
The Sixth Circuit in Omnicare created a wholly new test.100 It was 
concerned that too tight a standard would promote plausible 
deniability, pressuring or encouraging managers to cheat as they 
allowed corporations to hide behind the lack of direct complicity by the 
highest-ranking officers.101 On the other hand, it acknowledged that 
attribution of all employee knowledge went too far. So its modification 
of the common standard was two-fold. To clarify, it included within the 
zone of attribution the knowledge of any agent “who authorized, 
requested, commanded, furnished information for, prepared 
(including suggesting or contributing language for inclusion therein or 
omission therefrom), reviewed, or approved the statement in which the 
misrepresentation was made.”102 Then to expand the scope of 
responsibility, it added “any high managerial agent or member of the 
board of directors who ratified, recklessly disregarded, or tolerated the 
misrepresentation after its utterance or issuance.”103 The latter creates 
an internal duty to correct and, arguably, one to inquire, at least for 
purposes of attribution of knowledge. Using this approach to assess the 
adequacy of the pleadings, the court determined that the Vice 
President for Internal Audit’s knowledge was attributable to Omnicare 
because plaintiffs claimed that he both furnished information to 
higher-ranking employees before the disclosure and quietly tolerated 
the misstatements afterward.104 
The two Omnicare cases relate, although the connection is subtle. 
Scienter and materiality—what a reasonable investor thinks 
important—have a connection in the sense that the speaker must be 
aware of (or recklessly disregard) the propensity of the words or 
actions to mislead reasonable investors. This Article suggests a second 
connection: from the standpoint of the reasonable investor, corporate 
 
 99. In a later Sixth Circuit decision, the court did not go that far on imputation. See Doshi v. 
Gen. Cable Corp., No. 15-5621, 2016 WL 2991006, at *5 (6th Cir. May 24, 2016). 
 100. For a discussion and criticism, see generally Daniel V. McCaughey & Gregory L. 
Demers, Revisiting Corporate Scienter: In Search of a Middle Ground, 47 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) 858 (Apr. 27, 2015). 
 101. In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 475 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 102. Id. at 476. 
 103. Id. (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 483–84. Nonetheless, the court ultimately determined that a strong inference of 
scienter had not been shown. This was based on factual doubts about the attributed knowledge, 
not whether attribution was appropriate. Id. 
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disclosure implies a scope of knowledge or awareness of facts not 
limited to those actually crafting the words in question, or certifying 
their accuracy. The courts’ struggle regarding corporate scienter is 
about defining that scope of knowledge in a way that syncs to investors’ 
reasonable expectations—the same elicitation process endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in assessing opinion liability. Reasonable investors 
surely expect that corporate speech reflects more than the often limited 
(or compromised) knowledge of a handful at the very top. 
This Article need not resolve the question of what locution best 
captures this approach. To maintain consistency with a meaningful 
scienter requirement, there must be some kind of culpable breakdown 
in information flow—a deliberate or reckless failure to elevate in the 
face of an appreciation of the information’s disclosure importance.105 
What is crucial here is how much in the way of compliance-related 
information might satisfy this test and trigger corporate liability. 
IV.  DISCOURSE THEORY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
Omnicare opinion is its implications for the duties of corporate 
fiduciaries and, in particular, the board of directors. It arguably 
expands the zone of overlap between federal securities disclosure 
duties and state-law-based fiduciary duties. Omnicare’s direction that 
statements of belief be grounded in fact and, in some circumstances, 
require disclosure of the basis for the belief, may create a duty to justify 
the belief and, sometimes, explicate it.106 This holding is the essence of 
the information-forcing-substance nature of required disclosure. Put 
simply, especially after Omnicare, board members must ask enough 
questions about significant legal-risk matters to be comfortable that 
neither the words making up the disclosure nor their fair implications 
could be misleading to investors. 
A. Information-Forcing-Substance Theory and Corporate 
Governance 
First, a discussion about the information-forcing-substance theory 
is in order.107 The range of issues about which disclosure is required is 
 
 105. See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and 
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1229–30 (2003). 
 106. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 107. See generally Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 
BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014) (developing information-forcing-substance theory); Hillary A. Sale 
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extremely broad and includes far more than just financial information. 
At issue in Omnicare were the disclosures related to risk factors 
required by Item 503.108 This provision—as well as several other 
provisions of Regulation S-K—requires registrants’ offering 
documents and annual reports to include descriptions of financial 
conditions, changes to financial conditions, and results of operations, 
as well as any other factors that might make an “offering speculative or 
risky.”109 The risk provisions require a concise, “plain English” 
discussion that is organized logically and is specific to the issuer.110 The 
purpose of this disclosure provision is to ensure that issuers provide 
potential investors with information that might reveal problems, 
including a lack of profits in recent periods or issues with the business 
or financial position. In effect, every disclosure under Regulation S-K 
requires those drafting the report to: (1) ensure that the information 
exists; (2) confirm it is accurate; (3) determine whether and how to 
disclose it, including ensuring sufficient disclosure; and (4) disclose the 
information. This is the information-forcing-substance theory at work. 
Importantly, the core of the theory is not just a disclosure 
requirement. Instead, by requiring disclosures and officer and director 
signatures on offering documents, the SEC forces attention to the 
underlying details, backed up by the potential for a strict-liability cause 
of action in the public-offering context.111 Thus, by combining ex ante 
required disclosures with ex post liability, the securities framework 
places the directors in a gatekeeping role that ties to their state-law-
based fiduciary duties. To meet the disclosure requirements, directors 
must ensure accurate and complete disclosures, and to do so, directors 
should dialogue with officers and peers. Once engaged and informed, 
they must make a choice about what else, if anything, should be 
disclosed and whether changes in the conduct of business should occur 
to lessen the risks. 
Now apply that theory to the oversight and risk-management role 
of directors. The basic premise here is that issuers must choose whether 
a risk requires disclosure at all and, if so, what (and how much) 
information should be disclosed. Either way, dialogue about whether 
 
& Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015) (stressing the importance of transparency and “publicness” goals to 
a complete theory of securities regulation). 
 108. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2015). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. § 229.503. 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).  
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risks exist and how significant they might be is required before the 
disclosure can be approved. The directors’ job is to ask questions and 
question answers to assure themselves that management is on track 
with respect to understanding and vetting risks to the company. The 
absence of this type of risk conversation means that the directors have 
not effectively monitored the oversight and disclosure processes. It 
means that they are not actively engaged, which in turn means that they 
did not make a conscious choice. In the end, that may be their undoing. 
Indeed, the failure to make a conscious choice precludes business-
judgment-rule protection for state fiduciary-breach claims and can 
result in federal securities disclosure violations.112 In short, the 
disclosure regulations essentially require the board to have and 
understand information about risk and financial issues. The directors 
must go beyond the words presented to them and, in doing so, create 
an expectation that management will push information up to the board. 
This process would allow the board to assure itself that it understands 
the risk issues and ensure that the underlying compliance, oversight, 
and risk-management systems are in place. 
This discourse about disclosure is the core of the information-
forcing-substance theory. Indeed, when the dialogue occurs, it is 
possible that the result will be a different and more accurate 
assessment. It is, however, also possible that the result will be no 
change in the disclosure, and that too is a choice and a form of active 
decisionmaking. Thus, the disclosure requirements create a space in 
which the board and management must have a discussion about the 
underlying issue, thereby creating pressure for disclosure accuracy. 
The outcome is conversation and conscious decisionmaking that result 
in substantive changes and, as appropriate, disclosures.113 And it is here 
that disclosures connect to the state-law-based fiduciary duties of 
officers and directors. 
B. Omnicare’s Impact on the Information-Forcing-Substance Theory 
Now consider the disclosures at issue in Omnicare. Both of the 
alleged omissions involved assertions of legal compliance with respect 
 
 112. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (“[I]t should be noted that the 
business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it 
has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, 
failed to act.”). 
 113. Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1380 
(2006). 
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to contracts, presenting the question of how these types of omissions 
might connect to the role of directors who generally are not, and do not 
need to be, legal experts. Thus, for this Article’s purposes, the question 
is whether the Court’s discourse about these particular disclosures and 
its approach to registrants’ use of “we believe” more generally, 
implicates what directors need to do before signing off on filings. Our 
answer is yes. 
Recall the two alleged misstatements: 
We believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare 
providers, our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy practices 
are in compliance with applicable federal and state laws.114 
And: 
We believe that our contracts with pharmaceutical manufacturers are 
legally and economically valid arrangements that bring value to the 
healthcare system and the patients that we serve.115 
As the Court noted, both of these statements are grounded in legal 
analysis. Thus, for the statements to be accurate, legal analysis had to 
occur and the conclusions had to be based in reality. As held by the 
Court, an objective reasonable investor can “understand opinion 
statement[s] to convey facts about how the speaker has formed the 
opinion—or, otherwise put, about the speaker’s basis for holding that 
view.”116 In short, reasonable investors would expect not only that the 
issuer in fact believed the statement but also that the statement was 
“fairly align[ed] with the information in the issuer’s possession at the 
time.”117 Issuers do not have to share all of their knowledge or internal 
information. Omnicare makes clear, however, that before signing off 
on an opinion statement, directors must inquire as to the basis for the 
opinion and assure themselves both of its existence and its 
 
 114. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1323 (2015) (citing Joint Appendix at 95, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-435)). This disclosure 
was incorporated by reference into the registration statement of the offering at issue. Joint 
Appendix at 12, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-435). It appeared in Omnicare’s annual report 
for multiple years as part of Item 1, the “Description of Business.” It also appeared in prior 
offering documents. See supra note 80. 
 115. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Joint Appendix at 137, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 
(No. 13-435)). This disclosure appears for the first time in the offering document at issue and is in 
the Item 503(c) Risk section. 
 116. Here, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that a lawyer had opined that a “particular 
contract carried a heightened risk of liability under anti-kickback laws.” Id. at 1324 (citing Joint 
Appendix at 225, Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (No. 13-435)). 
 117. Id. at 1329. 
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reasonableness.118 This approach further explicates the directors’ duty 
to inquire: to ask questions, question answers, and, at times, insist on 
changes. That is the core of the directors’ monitoring and oversight 
role—ensuring that managers have functioning compliance systems in 
place and insisting on changes when alerted to red flags or risk-
management and compliance concerns.119 
The Court also held that in some circumstances, an issuer may 
have to add information to an opinion statement to make certain that 
the it is not misleading by omission.120 This half-truth requirement also 
pushes on director duties. In addition to establishing that a well-
functioning compliance system is in place, directors must consider 
whether statements about that system require clarification and 
whether the disclosure is sufficiently fulsome. Confirming 
completeness, however, may well press directors to expand their 
understanding of the issuer’s determinations about the validity and 
legality of its compliance systems and proffered legal opinions. 
C. How Securities Law Develops Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
The Omnicare opinion has the potential for considerable traction 
in the fiduciary-duty-of-monitoring context. One of the alleged 
misstatements was not new: the same language appeared in prior 
offering documents.121 Yet, in the interim, the regulatory and 
enforcement climate surrounding some of Omnicare’s practices had 
changed.122 Consistent with the understanding of the duty of good faith, 
 
 118. Id. at 1332–33. 
 119. Cf. In re Rita L. Schwartz, Exchange Act Release No. 42,684, 72 SEC Docket 432, 434–
435 (Apr. 13, 2000) (entering cease and desist order against outside director; stating that 
“directors have a duty . . . to oversee the corporation’s financial reporting process and to ensure 
the integrity and completeness of public statements made by the corporation”); see also SEC v. 
Chancellor Corp., Litigation Release No. 19177, 85 SEC Docket 588, 588 (Apr. 11, 2005) (settling 
allegations, with no admission, against an outside director who, the Commission alleged, had 
recklessly signed materially misleading financial statements without inquiring about the basis for 
accounting choices). 
 120. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332. 
 121. See supra note 80.  
 122. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a rise in the number of investigations of and suits 
against pharmaceutical manufacturers for Medicaid and Medicare fraud under the False Claims 
Act and Anti-Kickback Act. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, New York Will Sue 2 
Big Drug Makers on Doctor Discount, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/
02/13/business/new-york-will-sue-2-big-drug-makers-on-doctor-discount.html [https://perma.cc/
B2BE-8MF8] (stating that New York state joined six other states in “a growing legal attack on a 
longstanding practice” of providing discounts to doctors and pharmacists to entice them to choose 
certain drugs over others to prescribe and distribute). As a result of the increased number of 
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directors should be aware of changes in enforcement practices, and 
those changes should prompt directors to ask questions to fulfill their 
duties.123 Now, the federal-disclosure side adds muscle to that duty and, 
arguably, raises the ante by requiring either the articulation of facts 
undergirding the opinion or a statement clarifying that the belief is 
tentative.124 Directors who see the language “we believe” or are 
reviewing statements of opinion should ask about the underlying facts 
supporting the statement and assure themselves that the belief or 
opinion is warranted, particularly where, as in Omnicare, the second 
alleged misstatement contains legal-risk language that appeared for the 
first time in an increasingly aggressive enforcement environment. 
When directors review the language, they should be aware that they 
will likely be asking the drafter of the “we believe” language to take a 
step back and question her own choice.125 However difficult this 
situation might be, it is arguably the purpose of the disclosure 
requirements and supports the healthy skepticism that directors are 
supposed to apply to issuer documents.126 As noted earlier, excessive 
deference to the company’s lawyers on legal-risk matters is dangerous 
in light of incentives and biases that lawyers have to protect the 
company from disclosure of uncomfortable facts and to be overly 
wedded to advice given previously, especially if those lawyers work in-
house. 
Importantly, the connection between directors and disclosure is 
not new. Indeed, over time, the SEC has reiterated the role that the 
board is expected to play in monitoring disclosures or, put differently, 
 
investigations into the practices of large pharmaceutical companies, the Office of the Inspector 
General released compliance standards for those companies in their financial arrangements with 
doctors and pharmacies regarding the pricing of their drugs. Office of Inspector General, 
Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 
2003).  
 123. Cf. McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 823 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding in the context of 
monitoring duty that directors should have been aware of enforcement actions and increased 
regulatory push). 
 124. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1332. The Court also rejected the argument that liability for 
misleading opinions would “chill disclosures useful to investors.” Id. Instead, the Court’s view was 
that issuers have an incentive to sell and therefore to disclose. Id.  
 125. See Adair Morse, Wei Wang, & Serena Wu, Executive Lawyers: Gatekeepers or Totems 
of Governance? 26 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469931 
[https://perma.cc/Q2VZ-YRET] (offering “evidence that executive lawyers are incentivized to 
compromise internal governance monitoring time when faced with the call to add strategic 
input”). Indeed, the study casts doubt on lawyers as gatekeepers when the lawyers are paid like 
senior managers.  
 126. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (a director 
must check facts and not rely solely on representations taken at face value). 
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the role that disclosure plays in corporate governance. Outside 
directors are rarely “speakers” on behalf of issuers, except in the 
context of director-signed offering and proxy documents. They are, 
however, disclosure monitors, which arguably is their role in the 
context of offerings as well—“tak[ing] . . . care in ensuring the accuracy 
of the statements” made.127 
The SEC has spoken clearly about the role of outside directors in 
this context. It has “long viewed the issue of corporate governance and 
the fiduciary obligations of members of management and the boards of 
directors of public companies to their investors as an issue of 
paramount importance to the integrity and soundness of capital 
markets.”128 And, recently, Chair White spoke strongly about the 
importance of the directors’ gatekeeping role, noting that they must 
“establish expectations for senior management and the company as a 
whole, and exercise appropriate oversight to ensure that those 
expectations are met.”129 The Commission has also stated that directors 
should review and sometimes be involved in the preparation and 
drafting of disclosures.130 Indeed, after Enron, CEOs and CFOs must 
discuss and review certain reports with the board’s audit committee 
before the individuals can file their financial certifications.131 The duty 
to review and question public statements and filings exists at all times, 
and it is particularly stringent in the context of filings that are signed 
by directors. For those, the SEC has stated the directors “must take 
 
 127. Corporate Governance: SEC Official Says Enforcement Staff Seeking Actions Against 
Outside Directors, 37 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 2098, 2098 (Dec. 19, 2005) (quoting then-
Deputy Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division Peter Bresnan). 
 128. Report of Investigation in the Matter of the Cooper Cos., Inc., as It Relates to the 
Conduct of Cooper’s Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35082, 1994 SEC LEXIS 
3975, at *20 (Dec. 12, 1994) (stating that directors must take “immediate and effective action” to 
protect shareholders with accurate statements). 
 129. Mary Jo White, Chair, Securities & Exchange Commission, A Few Things Directors 
Should Know About the SEC, Speech Before the Twentieth Annual Stanford Directors’  
College (June 23, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863 [https://
perma.cc/642N-52MR]. 
 130. Circumstances Affecting the Determination of What Constitutes Reasonable 
Investigation and Reasonable Grounds for Belief Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6335, 23 SEC Docket 401, 407 (Aug. 18, 1981) (stating that 
involving directors in preparing Form 10-K can help satisfy due-diligence requirements in the 
context of Section 11). 
 131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2012). 
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steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the statements 
contained therein.”132 
In practice, these obligations mean that the directors must at least 
ask questions about disclosures and the basis for those statements, and, 
if they do not receive fulsome answers, they must ask for more 
information.133 The Commission’s longstanding view of the role of 
directors is one that is active rather than passive. It expects directors 
“to maintain a general familiarity with their company’s 
communications with the public.”134 It has further stressed that 
directors must play a role because there “may be a tendency for 
corporate disclosure to lag behind developments [and] there may be 
resistance on the part of management to make full and fair 
disclosure.”135 Hedging and paltering occur, and directors must guard 
against them.136 As a result, directors must consider any 
communications in the context of “what they know to be the facts.”137 
If they discover inconsistencies or concerns, the Commission has stated 
that it is their job to demand “appropriate revisions or additions.”138 
Indeed, in the words of Chair White, directors should 
ask the difficult questions, particularly if [they] see something 
suspicious or problematic, or, simply when [they] do not understand. 
[They] should never hesitate to ask more questions, and, always, insist 
on answers when questions arise. It also goes without saying that 
[they] should never ignore red flags. It is [their] job to be 
knowledgeable about issues, to be vigilant in protecting against 
wrongdoing, and to tackle difficult issues head on.139 
Offering documents present a specific context. Here, the SEC has 
stated that protection via the due-diligence defense requires front-end 
 
 132. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Concerning the Conduct of Certain Former Officers and Directors of W.R. Grace & Co., 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-39157, 65 SEC Docket 1240, 1241 (Sept. 30, 1997). 
 133. Report of Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating to 
Activities of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corporation, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-11516, 7 SEC Docket 298, 299 (July 2, 1975) (noting that directors asked questions, but did not 
push when answers were not forthcoming). 
 134. Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to 
Activities of the Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
34-14380, 13 SEC Docket 1393, 1396 (Jan. 16, 1978). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. White, supra note 129. 
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allocations of time for verifying disclosures.140 For example, in 
discussing the contested disclosures in Omnicare, both the Court’s 
opinion and the Commission’s releases indicate that the directors have 
to hear the chief legal officer confirm that she agreed with the 
prospectus’s draft language.141 In particular, the board, or a committee 
of the board, needed to ask if the “we believe” statements or other 
statements of opinion were still valid or whether the legal environment 
had shifted such that the basis for the statements was actually more 
tentative than the language revealed. As a result, a key question 
directors should ask is what the current basis for the belief is and, 
perhaps, whether the company’s choices are sufficiently different from 
those of its competitors facing enforcement to support the statement 
of belief.142 That very discussion is the essence of the directors’ role in 
monitoring and in monitoring through disclosure. It is also how the 
required federal securities disclosure forces action or conduct on the 
part of the directors, thereby adding to the information-forcing role of 
disclosure regulation and carving out its space in the state-law, 
fiduciary-duty zone. 
Here, the Court’s opinion meets the language of prior SEC 
Releases and presses directors to step up their vigilance of  
publicly filed documents as part of their “corporate governance  
and . . . fiduciary obligations.”143 In the context of Omnicare-like 
statements, directors who meet their obligation will discuss their legal-
belief statements with the lawyers. Moreover, directors will ask 
whether the belief requires updating or whether the underlying 
circumstances have changed. Legal opinions are rarely given with iron-
clad guarantees, but direct inquiries will push on hedging and should 
result in conscious choices about whether to provide additional 
disclosures. In short, in the context of compliance, directors must insert 
themselves in the disclosure process and actively engage in regular, 
good-faith monitoring of the company’s systems and choices and its 
disclosures. They “must be vigilant in exercising their authority 
throughout the disclosure process.”144 In some situations, the outcome 
 
 140. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (2015). 
 141. Omnicare, Inc., v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1328–29 (2015). 
 142. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-11516, supra note 133, 7 SEC Docket at 299 (noting 
that directors learned of concerns about financial practices from media and did not press 
management for sufficient information to learn the truth.). 
 143. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-35082, supra note 128, at *19. 
 144. Exchange Act Release No. 34-39157, supra note 132, 65 SEC Docket at 1241. 
SALE & LANGEVOORT IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2016  11:01 AM 
2016] “WE BELIEVE” 795 
may not be additional disclosure, and that is okay. Indeed, the goal is 
the conversation about what is or is not misleading, and these sorts of 
discussions should become an ongoing and enriched part of the 
directors’ oversight duty and the director–management dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article reveals that Omnicare’s power is in how it reinforces 
the directors’ duty to monitor through the information-forcing-
substance theory. It presses directors to inquire about both the basis 
for public statements, here legal-risk statements, as well as whether the 
basis should be disclosed in order to prevent a half-truth.145 This 
approach, the Court held, is consistent with what reasonable investors 
interpreting belief statements about legal compliance expect: that the 
issuer in fact believed the statement and that it “fairly align[ed] with 
the information in the issuer’s possession at the time.”146 To ensure 
accuracy in the belief, the directors presumably must play their 
oversight role in a fulsome manner, asking questions, questioning 
answers, and, when needed, ensuring that changes or “revisions or 
additions” to communications occur.147 Indeed, as the SEC has stated, 
“[D]irectors who review, approve, or sign [company documents] must 
take steps to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the statements 
contained therein.”148 Thus, the power of the information-forcing-
substance theory and the role it plays in forcing fiduciaries to act both 
becomes apparent and reveals the ways in which it occupies space in 
and provides backbone to the state-law, fiduciary-duty zone. 
 
 145. Cf. Report of Investigation in the Matter of the Cooper Cos., Inc., as It Relates to the 
Conduct of Cooper’s Board of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 34-35082, 1994 SEC LEXIS 
3975, at *12 (Dec. 12, 1994) (criticizing directors for omissions in public statements concerning 
wrongdoing by officers). 
 146. Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380, supra note 
134, 13 SEC Docket at 1395 (criticizing directors for doing “nothing effective to ensure that they 
be provided accurate, current information”). 
 147. Exchange Act Release No. 34-14380, supra note 134, 13 SEC Docket at 1396; see 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-11516, supra note 133, 7 SEC Docket at 300 (criticizing directors 
for relying on “self-serving” representations of management and others, rather than pushing for 
clarifications and additional information); see also Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 
643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stating that an outside director needs to engage in reasonable 
investigation of answers from management and experts).  
 148. Exchange Act Release No. 34-39157, supra note 144, 65 SEC Docket at 1241. 
